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Abstract
In a range of settings, private ﬁrms manage peer eﬀects by sorting agents into diﬀerent
groups, be they schools, neighbourhoods or teams. This paper considers such a ﬁrm, which
controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision
systematically leads to two distortions relative to the eﬃcient solution: ﬁrst, agents are
segregated too ﬁnely; second, too many agents are excluded from all groups. We demonstrate
that these distortions are a consequence of anonymous pricing and do not depend upon the
nature of the peer eﬀects. This general approach also allows us to assess the way the
‘returns to scale’ of peer technology and the cost of group formation aﬀect the optimal
group structure.
1 Introduction
In an increasingly privatised world, for–proﬁt organisations have come to play an important
role in many markets where peer eﬀects are prominent. This paper considers such a market,
where a ﬁrm posts a series of prices and agents self–select into diﬀerent groups. The quality of
a group, in turn, depends on the characteristics of its members. We show that private provision
systematically leads to two distortions in group formation relative to the eﬃcient solution. First,
there is too much segregation between diﬀerent types of agents; that is, groups are excessively
homogenous. Second, too many agents are excluded from all available groups.
The model captures the key features of several important markets. First, consider the
market for education, where peer eﬀects play an important role in shaping students’ goals and
learning experience. In such a market, ﬁrms can manage peer eﬀects to their advantage by
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1charging more for courses which attract above–average students. This type of diﬀerentiation
is commonplace: providers of higher education and professional training consistently use peer
eﬀects to price–discriminate between diﬀerent institutions and diﬀerent courses of otherwise
similar quality. The growing popularity of vouchers also promises to raise the importance of
private primary and secondary schools, which will similarly seek to manipulate peer eﬀects.
Epple and Romano (1998) and Caucutt (2002), among others, have investigated the role of
selection when schools are highly competitive. This paper analyses the optimal pricing policy
for a school with market power.1
The second application concerns the market for community formation, where peer eﬀects
are a major determinant or consumers’ preferences. In recent years, this market has seen a
signiﬁcant expansion in the role of the private sector, with more than forty million Americans
currently living in common interest developments (e.g. condominiums, planned unit develop-
ments). Proponents argue that these new communities increase welfare by providing safety and
comfort for those willing to pay; critics counter that they are discriminatory and isolationist.
Our model is consistent with both these arguments, showing how group formation increases
welfare, but also that private provision leads to communities that are insuﬃciently diverse.2
Thirdly, peer eﬀects play an important role in the theory of the ﬁrm. According to Alchian
and Demsetz (1972), facilitating teamwork is a major activity, and perhaps even the deﬁning
property, of a ﬁrm. While the composition of a team is often taken as exogenous, ﬁrms will seek
to assemble compatible agents in order to maximise their productivity and minimise their wage
bill. This paper thus analyses optimal team formation within a ﬁrm, examining how diﬀerent
types of peer eﬀects alter group composition.
One signiﬁcant problem in analysing peer eﬀects is that the nature of peer technology is
likely to diﬀer greatly across environments. In a recent survey on the role of private education,
Helen Ladd (2002, p. 14) wrote:
“This lack of clarity about how peer eﬀects diﬀer among groups rules out any clear
predictions about whether a voucher program would be likely to increase or decrease
the overall productivity of the education system through the mechanism of peer
eﬀects”.
Despite this concern, we analyse the distortions induced by private provision while placing very
little structure on the nature of peer eﬀects. This general approach enables us to examine how
1Due to transportation costs, schools and universities already possess considerable local market power. As
private schools become more popular, it is also likely that chains, such as Edison in the U.S. and GEMS in
Britain, will become increasingly powerful.
2The model applies to many other types of communities: restaurants, golf clubs and luxury good manufac-
turers all seek to aﬀect the attractiveness of their product through exclusivity. For example, Kaneﬀ owns six
golf courses in Ontario, charging a range of fees, separating diﬀerent types of customers into groups. See Rayo
(2005) for other examples.
2the degree of segregation depends on the form of peer eﬀects. It also helps us interpret the
recent empirical literature quantifying peer eﬀects in diﬀerent environments.
1.1 Outline of the Paper
The basic structure of the model is as follows. First, a single principal posts a range of anony-
mous group–entry prices. Agents vary in their willingness to pay for group quality and, after
observing these prices, sort themselves into diﬀerent groups. The quality of a group, in turn,
depends upon the types of its members. This quality function is allowed to be very general and
subsumes the average quality model (e.g. Rayo (2005)), the Cobb–Douglas quality model (e.g.
Epple and Romano (1998)) and the multiplicative quality model (e.g. Lazear (2001)).
Since pricing is anonymous, the principal must rely on agents to self–select into diﬀerent
groups. Self–selection immediately implies that that agents who care more about group quality
must be in better quality groups (the monotonicity condition). This result implies that if the
agents who generate high quality have a low willingness to pay, then the principal must assign
all agents to identical groups. Conversely, if the agents who generate high quality have a high
willingness to pay, then the principal can segregate the agents into groups of diﬀerent standards.
The paper ﬁrst analyses the principal’s problem when group formation is costless, showing
that proﬁt–maximisation leads to two distortions relative to the welfare–maximising group
structure. The ﬁrst distortion, the segregation eﬀect, states that there are too many groups
under proﬁt–maximisation. Intuitively, by splitting a group into two, putting all high types
into one group and the low types into another, the principal increases the price the high types
are willing to pay in order to avoid the low quality group. Crucially, we do not require any
assumptions on the nature of peer eﬀects in order to attain this result: the required restrictions
come endogenously from the requirement that agents self–select into groups. This segregation
eﬀect implies that the distribution of group qualities under private provision has a lower mean
and will tend to be more dispersed than the eﬃcient distribution.
The second distortion, the exclusion eﬀect, states that too many agents are excluded from
all privately provided groups. The exclusion eﬀect is analogous to the standard result that a
monopolist prices above marginal cost. Intuitively, excluding some low types of agents raises
the price paid by those agents who are not excluded.
We further analyse how the optimal group structure depends upon the nature of peer inter-
actions. When a quality function has decreasing returns to scale, in that splitting a group into
two subgroups raises the average quality, then welfare and proﬁt are maximised by complete
separation. That is, every type is in a group of his own,3 so agents associate with those just like
themselves and ignore everyone else. Conversely, when a quality function has increasing returns
3The principal is female, while agents are male.
3to scale, in that splitting a group into two subgroups lowers the average quality, then matching
will be assortative (i.e. groups will be connected) and there will tend to be some pooling.
The paper also examines the principal’s problem when group formation is costly. This set-
ting introduces a new factor, the appropriability eﬀect, according to which a welfare–maximising
principal may invest more in group formation than a proﬁt–maximising principal. Intuitively,
a proﬁt–maximiser cannot appropriate agents’ consumer surplus and may opt for larger groups
than is optimal. Nevertheless, under increasing returns to scale and the usual monotone haz-
ard rate condition, the segregation eﬀect dominates the appropriability eﬀect and groups are
smaller under proﬁt–maximisation.
We also investigate how welfare– and proﬁt–maximising group structures change with rel-
ative position. This is motivated by Lazear (2001) who argues that more able students will
tend to be in larger classes. In our model, when group formation is costless, we also ﬁnd that
higher types will tend to be in larger groups, albeit for a very diﬀerent reason. The intuition
behind our result is that the ratio between the highest and lowest types in a group declines as
everyone’s type rises. This means a group split, which helps the high types but hurts the low
types, becomes less desirable. This suggests that selective grammar schools were of more use
in the 1950s, when education levels were relatively low, than today. In comparison, Lazear’s
ﬁnding derives from the speciﬁcs of the multiplicative quality model, under which returns to
scale increase in agents’ types
The paper proceeds as follows. The remainder of this section provides a literature review,
while Section 2 considers a simple two–type example that captures a number of the main eﬀects.
Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 assesses the implications of self–selection. Sections
5 and 6 analyse the costless group formation problem, deriving the segregation and exclusion
eﬀects. Section 7 examines the costly group formation problem, comparing appropriability and
segregation eﬀects. Section 8 derives conditions under which higher types are in larger groups,
and Section 9 concludes.
1.2 Literature
It is helpful to break the peer group literature into three branches.
The ﬁrst branch considers a single principal with perfect information about agents’ charac-
teristics. In their classic paper, Arnott and Rowse (1987) analyse the socially optimal way to
break students into N groups in the presence of peer eﬀects. A student’s utility is a function
of his ability, the mean ability of the other students in the class and educational expenditure.
Using a Cobb–Douglas quality function, the authors obtain suﬃcient conditions for assorta-
tive matching and computationally solve several examples. Lazear (2001) considers a highly
tractable model where each student is disruptive with probability p. If there are m students in
the class who act independently of each other then the class is attentive proportion (1 − p)m
4of the time. Lazear shows that a welfare–maximising school increases class sizes as p increases
and, in a two–type model, will segregate students by type.4
In the second branch, there is a single principal with imperfect information about agents’
characteristics. Helsley and Strange (2000) analyse common interest developments with social
interactions. Agents, who vary in their type, choose whether to stay in the public sector or join
a single private community, and subsequently choose an action. Agents’ utility then depends
upon their action, their type and the mean action of those in their community. Helsley and
Strange allow the private community to choose both a minimum required action and an entry
price. In a numerical example they show fewer people secede from the public sector when the
community is proﬁt–maximising, in a similar spirit to our exclusion eﬀect.
The two closest papers to the current one both consider a principal who price discriminates
between agents by sorting them into diﬀerent groups of diﬀerent qualities. Rayo (2005) considers
a one–sided matching problem, similar to ours, where the principal breaks the agents up into
groups. Rayo uses the average–quality function and investigates the role of non–monotone
marginal revenue functions (see Section 5.4). Damiano and Li (2006) analyse a two–sided
matching market where the principal can discriminate between diﬀerent sides of the market
and between diﬀerent groups. Damiano and Li derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
full separation.5
The third branch analyses competition between peer groups. Epple and Romano (1998)
analyse a model of private school competition, where agents diﬀer in their income and ability,
both of which are publicly observable. Epple and Romano show that monopolistic competition
between schools with ﬁxed costs leads to stratiﬁcation of the market where poor talented agents
attend the same schools as wealthy untalented agents. Caucutt (2002) introduces educational
expenditure and shows that complete segregation may not be desirable, even without ﬁxed
costs of setting up schools. Intuitively, a school can keep its quality constant by lowering its
expenditure on teachers but recruiting a few talented students.6
The discussion of the empirical literature is postponed until Section 3.1.
4In a related model, Kremer (1993) considers a groups of agents on a production line who each make a mistake
with probability pi. In the competitive equilibrium, there is assortative matching and higher quality workers
work in longer production lines.
5Also relevant is Pesendorfer (1995) who supposes that status is driven by a two–sided matching problem,
where a durable status good is sold by a monopolist. Pesendorfer argues that the ﬁrm will regularly introduce
new designs if they cannot commit to a price path or if there is imitation.
6One can view these papers of applications of club theory (e.g. Scotchmer (2002)). Related papers include
Nechyba (2000) and Benabou (1993). For a model with imperfect information see Damiano and Li (2005).
52 Two–Type Example
There are equal numbers of two types of agents, θH > θL, where an agent’s type describes his
willingness to pay for quality. The utility of type θi who is assigned to a group of quality Q(θi)
and pays price y(θi) is given by u(θi) = θiQ(θi) − y(θi), for i ∈ {L,H}. The quality of a group
is determined by the types of its members. A group consisting of θH agents has quality QH; a
group consisting of θL agents has quality QL; and a group consisting of both types has quality
QLH. An agent’s outside option is 0. Finally, we suppose that agents are small, so no individual
agent can aﬀect the quality of a group.
The principal posts anonymous group–entry prices and lets agents self–select into the dif-
ferent groups. This means that, in order to stop the high type copying the low type, we must
have Q(θH) ≥ Q(θL) (the monotonicity condition). Consequently, the principal can separate
the agents if and only if QH ≥ QL; otherwise a high type would enter the low type’s group
rather than his own.
2.1 Segregation Eﬀect
Let us ﬁrst consider the principal’s incentive to separate the two types of agents. For simplicity,
assume that 2θL ≥ θH and that the principal does not exclude either type. Utility is quasi–
linear, so welfare equals θLQ(θL) + θHQ(θH). A welfare–maximising principal would therefore
like to separate the agents when
θHQH + θLQL ≥ θHQLH + θLQLH (2.1)
Deﬁne QW
LH as the pooling quality that equates both sides of (2.1). If QH < QL, the principal
can only pool the agents. If QH ≥ QL, then the principal will separate the agents when
QLH ≤ QW
LH. Since QW
LH ≥ (QH + QL)/2, separation is optimal if the quality function is
increasing, QH ≥ QL, and satisﬁes decreasing returns to scale, in that QLH ≤ (QH + QL)/2.
A proﬁt–maximising principal maximises total payments, y(θL) + y(θH). If the principal
pools both types, she will charge y(θL) = y(θH) = θLQLH in order to fully extract from the low
type, θL. On the other hand, if the principal separates both types, she will charge y(θL) = θLQL
to the low group and y(θH) = θLQH −(θH −θL)QL to the high group. Under these prices, the
low type is just willing to join the low group, while the high type is indiﬀerent between joining
the high and low groups. Putting this together, the proﬁt–maximising principal would like to
separate the agents when
θHQH + (2θL − θH)QL ≥ 2θLQLH (2.2)
Deﬁne QΠ
LH as the pooling quality that equates both sides of (2.2). If QH < QL, then the
principal can only pool the agents. If QH ≥ QL, then QΠ
LH ≥ QW
LH, so a proﬁt–maximising
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Figure 1: Two–Type Model with QH ≥ QL.
principal is more willing to separate the agents than a welfare–maximising principal (see Figure
1). Intuitively, by separating high and low types, the good agents become very keen to avoid the
bad agents and can be forced to pay higher prices. Notice that this segregation eﬀect requires
no assumptions about the structure of qualities (QL,QH,QLH): the fact that Q(θH) ≥ Q(θL)
follows from the endogenous self–selection constraint.
2.2 Exclusion Eﬀect
If 2θL < θH, then the proﬁt–maximising principal may wish to exclude the low types in order
to increase revenue. To see this, consider the case where QH ≥ QL.7 The welfare–maximising
principal never excludes any type of agent, and separates the two types if (2.1) holds. In
contrast, the proﬁt–maximising principal may wish to exclude the low type, enabling her to
charge y(θH) = θHQH to the remaining high types. She therefore wishes to separate the two
types if
θHQH + max{2θL − θH,0}QL ≥ 2θLQLH (2.3)
As above, (2.1) implies (2.3). This shows that the segregation eﬀect extends to the case where we
allow exclusion. Moreover, a proﬁt–maximising principal is more willing to exclude agents than
a welfare–maximising principal. This exclusion eﬀect is analogous to the standard monopoly
distortion: by cutting out low types the principal increases the price she can charge the high
types.
2.3 Appropriability Eﬀect
So far we have assumed that splitting the agents into two groups is free of charge. Costly group
formation introduces a third eﬀect. To illustrate, let us assume that QH ≥ QL. Using equation
(2.1), the beneﬁt of separation for a welfare–maximising principal is
θH(QH − QLH) + θL(QL − QLH) (2.4)
7This assumption is not necessary. If QH < QL then the principal may wish to exclude the low type in
order to ‘monotonise’ the quality function (see Section 6). However, it is straightforward to show that both the
segregation and exclusion eﬀects continue to apply.
7If 2θL ≥ θH, equation (2.2) implies that the beneﬁt of separation for a proﬁt–maximising
principal is
θH(QH − QLH) + (2θL − θH)(QL − QLH) (2.5)
Hence, if group formation is costly, and there are very strong decreasing returns to scale,
QL ≥ QLH, then the welfare–maximising principal is willing to pay more to separate the
agents than the proﬁt–maximising principal. This appropriability eﬀect is caused by the proﬁt–
maximising principal’s inability to appropriate the agents’ consumer surplus. However, when
there are suﬃcient returns to scale, then the segregation eﬀect outweighs the appropriability
eﬀect and the proﬁt–maximising principal is more likely to separate the groups.
3 Basic Model
Agents’ Preferences. A single principal faces a continuum of agents with privately known
willingness to pay θ ∈ [θ,θ] ⊂ IR+. Types are distributed according to positive density f(θ)
with distribution function F(θ). Agents then choose to join one of the available groups, or
choose not to participate. If agent θ joins a group of quality Q and pays price y, he obtains
utility
u = θQ − y.
If an agent chooses not to participate, he obtains zero utility.
Principal’s Problem. The principal ﬁrst chooses a series of group–entry prices; agents sub-
sequently self–select into groups G ⊂ [θ,θ]. Applying the revelation principle, we analyse the
direct revelation mechanism hG,yi whereby agents announce their types, and the principal as-
signs them to a group G ∈ G and charges a fee y. Given any equilibrium in the price–setting
game, then there exists a corresponding direct revelation mechanism such that all agents accept
the mechanism (individual rationality) and all agents announce their types truthfully (incentive
compatibility). The principal’s problem is thus to choose the mechanism hG,yi to maximise
welfare/proﬁts subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility.
Groups. The principal breaks the agents into groups G. For technical reasons, we restrict how
the principal can break up the agents. Let the collection of sets P be a ﬁnite partition of the type
space; that is, a collection of nonintersecting connected sets whose union equals [θ,θ]. A group
G is then the union of sets lying in P. A group structure G is a collection of nonintersecting
groups whose union equals [θ,θ]. Taking two group structures, GL and GH, we write GL ⊂ GH
if GH is ﬁner than GL. Two groups, G and G0, overlap if there exists θH > θM > θL, such that
θH,θL ∈ G and θM ∈ G0, or θH,θL ∈ G0 and θM ∈ G. Denote the sigma–algebra of a group
structure by σ(G); since P is ﬁnite, this equals the collection of unions of sets in G.
8Peer Technology. Each group G is associated with a quality Q(G) > 0. Let Q(θ,G) denote
the quality of type θ’s group under group structure G. A quality function Q(G) is said to be
weakly increasing in G if Q(GH) ≥ Q(GL) whenever GH is larger than GL in the sense that
θ ≥ θ0 for all θ ∈ GH and θ0 ∈ GL.
Some remarks are in order. First, we do not insist that groups be connected. This is
important because the optimal group structure may place agents with a wide range of abilities in
the same group, as suggested by the empirical work of Mas and Moretti (2006) and experimental
study of Falk and Ichino (2006).
Second, the model restricts groups to be unions of sets in some underlying ﬁnite parti-
tion, P. This assumption is for technical simplicity. It enables us to avoid measure–theoretic
problems such as the creation of non–measurable sets. It also guarantees the problem has an
optimal solution. This restriction is analogous to having a ﬁnite number of types, although the
continuous type representation remains useful.8,9
Third, in the model above, we assume that the principal places each agent into a group.
That is, we assume it is not optimal for the principal to exclude any types of agents. This
assumption is for simplicity: we extend the analysis in Section 6.10
Finally, we say a function φ : IR → IR is quasi–increasing if φ(xL) ≥ 0 implies φ(xH) ≥ 0
for xH > xL, and weakly quasi–increasing if φ(xL) > 0 implies φ(xH) ≥ 0.
3.1 Group Quality Functions
The paper allows for a large range of quality functions, Q : G → IR++, subsuming those used
in a number of previous papers. This level of generality is particularly important since the peer
technology depends on the speciﬁc environment and is hard to quantify in any given application.
Some examples of quality functions are as follows:
• Average–quality: Q(G) = E[θ|θ ∈ G]. This states that the quality of a group is given by
the average type of its members. This is used by Rayo (2005) and matching papers such
as Damiano and Li (2006).
8In Examples 10–11 we drop the ﬁniteness restriction on the principal’s choice set and let σ(P) equal the
Borel sets, enabling the use of calculus.
9We also assume that diﬀerent agents of a single type are assigned to the same group. However, since
groups may be disconnected, any mixed strategy can be approximated by such a pure strategy. For example,
if θ ∼ U[0,1], then a group with measure 1/2 on [0,1/2] can be approximated by a group with measure 1 on
[0,1/8] ∪ [3/8,4/8]. This restriction is therefore minor if the quality functional, which maps measures on the
type space to the real line, is continuous in, say, the Prohorov metric.
10 The assumption of no exclusion is without loss of generality if the principal’s objective, MR(θ), is positive
(∀θ). In this case, one can deﬁne the quality function so that Q(G) = 0 if θ ∈ G. Pooling agent θ with type θ
is then equivalent to excluding θ. This ‘evil type’ model does not work if MR(θ) is negative since the objective
fails to be log–supermodular. Consequently, when we allow MR(θ) to be negative in Section 6, we use a diﬀerent
approach.
9• Average–quality with crowding out: Q(G) = E[θ|θ ∈ G] − mE[1G], where m > 0 repre-
sents the importance of crowding out.
• Generalised average–quality: Q(G) = φ1(E[φ2(θ)|θ ∈ G]). As a special case, this includes
the Cobb–Douglas quality function, Q(G) = E[θ1/α|θ ∈ G]β, which is used by Epple
and Romano (1998), Nechyba (2000), Caucutt (2002) and the latter parts of Arnott and
Rowse (1987).
• Linear–quality: Q(G) = αsup(G) + β inf(G). One special case of this is min–quality,
Q(G) = inf(G), where the group is only as good as its worst member. Another special
case is max–quality, Q(G) = sup(G), where the best agent becomes the “leader” of the
group.






, where m > 0. As shown in
Appendix A.1, this is a continuous analogue of the production functions in Kremer (1993)
and Lazear (2001).
There is a large empirical literature which seeks to estimate peer technology. While it is
hard to generalise, the magnitude of these peer eﬀects can be substantial. In the classroom,
Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau (1978) ﬁnd that moving a student from a weak class to
a strong class can increase their overall rank from the 50th percentile to the 20th percentile. In
the workplace, Mas and Moretti (2006) and Falk and Ichino (2006) ﬁnd a 10% increase in one’s
colleagues productivity raises a given worker’s productivity by around 1.5%. This literature
has analysed three major aspects of the production function.
First, nonlinearities in the peer technology. Looking at college roommates, Zimmerman
(2003) ﬁnds that bad students have a bigger eﬀect on their roommates than good students.
However, in a similar study, Sacerdote (2001) ﬁnds the converse: bad students seem to have
a smaller eﬀect on their roommates than good students. We will see that the former is an
example of decreasing returns to scale, implying that bad students should be segregated; while
the latter is an example of increasing returns to scale, implying that some mixing of abilities is
optimal (see Proposition 2). In a similar spirit, Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau (1978)
ﬁnd that test scores are a concave function of mean class ability. These results are consistent
with a generalised average–quality function where φ1(·) is concave, implying increasing returns
to scale.
Second, interaction eﬀects. In their workplace studies, Mas and Moretti (2006) and Falk
and Ichino (2006) ﬁnd that having good peers have a stronger eﬀect on poor workers. In
contrast, with college roommates, Zimmerman (2003) ﬁnds that peer eﬀects have the biggest
impact on students of middling ability. Looking at the classroom, Henderson, Mieszkowski, and
Sauvageau (1978) and Hanushek et al. (2003) report that there are few cross eﬀects. This latter
10result implies that, if all students care equally about their test scores, then it is impossible to
separate diﬀerent types of agents (see Lemma 2). However, if high ability students care more
about their test scores than low ability students, then separation can be sustained.
Third, scale eﬀects. In the education literature, there has been a long standing debate about
the impact of reductions in class size. While the desirability of small classes may seem obvious,
the evidence seems to ﬁnd beneﬁcial eﬀects only in certain environments (Hanushek (1999)).
In the workplace, Falk and Ichino (2006) ﬁnd agents are more productive at stuﬃng envelopes
when they work in the presence of others, although this result clearly depends on the task at
hand.
Looking across these studies, it seems that the peer technology can vary greatly with the
environment. This observation has two important implications. First, it is important to derive
results that do not depend on the exact nature of the peer eﬀects. To illustrate, both the
multiplicative quality and Cobb–Douglas quality are widely used models. However, while the
multiplicative model predicts that more able agents should be in larger groups (Lazear (2001)),
the Cobb–Douglas model predicts the opposite (Figure 4). The second implication is that
theory should identify which aspects of the peer technology are critical for a given result, rather
than working with a single functional form, which contains many hidden assumptions. This
approach both helps us categorise diﬀerent classes of peer technologies, and helps us understand
what to look for in the data.
4 Agents’ Problem
The principal runs a direct revelation mechanism hG,yi, in which an agent of type θ declares
that they are type ˆ θ, receives quality Q(ˆ θ,G) and makes payment y(ˆ θ). Since there are a
continuum of agents, the quality of an agent’s group depends on his declaration but not his
type. Utility is then
u(θ, ˆ θ) = θQ(ˆ θ,G) − y(ˆ θ) (4.1)
Deﬁne equilibrium utility to be U(θ) = u(θ,θ).
Lemma 1. A mechanism hG,yi is incentive compatible and individually rational if and only if:




Q(s,G) ds + U(θ) (4.2)
(b) The lowest type obtains U(θ) ≥ 0; and
(c) The monotonicity condition holds. That is, Q(θ,G) is increasing in θ.
Proof. Since Q(θ,G) is integrable, Milgrom and Segal (2002, Corollary 1) shows that incentive
compatibility implies (4.2). The rest of the proof is the same as Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
11Green (1995, Proposition 23.D.2).
Lemma 2. In any incentive compatible group structure:
(a) Any overlapping groups have the same quality.
(b) If Q(G) is weakly decreasing then every agent will be in a group of the same quality.
Proof. Follows from the monotonicity condition (Lemma 1(c)).
Lemma 2(a) says that while groups do not have to be connected, any overlapping groups
must have the same quality. Lemma 2(b) says that the principal cannot separate diﬀerent
types when the agents who generate high quality have a low willingness to pay. This may be
the case in the workplace if good workers most improve the performance of poor workers (e.g.
Mas and Moretti (2006), Falk and Ichino (2006)). Separation may also be diﬃcult with some
conspicuous goods, where agents seek to signal a certain image. For example, the consumers
who generate Harley–Davidson’s reputation are unlikely to have the highest incomes. Similarly,
the supporters with the highest willingness to pay for football tickets may not create the best
atmosphere.11
5 The Segregation Eﬀect
5.1 Principal’s Problem
Welfare equals the sum of utilities plus transfers,
W = E[θ Q(θ,G)] (5.1)








Proﬁt equals welfare (5.1) minus consumer surplus (5.2). The proﬁt–maximising principal will
set prices so that the lowest type’s individual rationality constraint binds, U(θ) = 0. Proﬁt is
then given by
Π = E [MR(θ)Q(θ,G)] (5.3)
where marginal revenue is deﬁned by
MR(θ) := θ −
1 − F(θ)
f(θ)
11In both these examples the ﬁrms use non–price mechanisms to maintain quality. Harley–Davidson uses
waiting lists, while football clubs force supporters to buy season tickets.
12Welfare and proﬁt can be thus combined into a single objective:
H = E [h(θ)Q(θ,G)] (5.4)
where h(θ) ∈ {θ,MR(θ)}. Let Γ be the set of group structures that satisfy the monotonicity
condition (Lemma 1(c)). The principal’s problem is then to choose G ∈ Γ to maximise (5.4).
The choice set Γ is ﬁnite, so a solution to the principal’s problem exists. Nevertheless, there
are two diﬃculties with this maximisation problem. First, Γ is not generally a lattice. Second,
Q(θ,G) is unlikely to be quasi–supermodular in G. Intuitively, two diﬀerent ways of splitting a
group are likely to be substitutes rather than complements. Consequently, the optimal set of
groups structures may not be a lattice.
5.2 Welfare– and Proﬁt–Maximisation
For a ﬁxed group structure G, let IG(G) be the smallest interval containing G that is made up
of elements of G.12 By Lemma 2(a), quality must be constant over all groups in IG(G). Let
I(G) be the partition formed by collecting the intervals {IG(G)}G∈G. Equivalently, let I(G) be
the partition induced by merging all overlapping groups in G.
Lemma 3. GL ⊂ GH implies I(GL) ⊂ I(GH).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Assumption (MON). [1 − F(θ)]/θf(θ) is decreasing in θ.
This assumption implies that MR(θ) is quasi–increasing. It is weaker than the usual hazard
rate condition (see Section 7).
Proposition 1 (Segregation Eﬀect). Suppose (MON) holds and MR(θ) ≥ 0. For any welfare–
maximising solution, GW, Π(GW) ≥ Π(G) on {G ∈ Γ : G ⊂ GW}. Hence if any optimal solu-
tions, GW and GΠ, are ordered in terms of set inclusion, then there exists a proﬁt–maximising
solution, GΠ∗, such that GW ⊂ GΠ∗.
Proof. Suppose GW maximises welfare and ﬁx G ∈ Γ such that G ⊂ GW. Since GW is welfare–
maximising, E[θ∆Q(θ)] ≥ 0, where ∆Q(θ) := Q(θ,GW)−Q(θ,G). Deﬁne I∗ to be the coarsest
partition on which ∆Q(θ) is quasi–increasing. Applying Lemma 3, I(G) ⊂ I(GW). Monotonic-
ity thus implies that ∆Q(θ) is increasing on each I ∈ I(G), so I∗ ⊂ I(G). See Figure 2 for an
illustration. The proof is now based on two steps.
12Formally, IG(G) is the smallest interval in σ(G) containing G. This is uniquely deﬁned.
13For the ﬁrst step, we claim that E[θ∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≥ 0.13 To see this suppose, by contradiction,
that E[θ∆Q(θ)|I∗] < 0 on some set A ∈ σ(I∗). Then deﬁne a new group structure, G0, equal to
G on A and GW elsewhere. This new structure has two properties. First, G0 has higher welfare
than GW, E[θQ(θ,G0)] > E[θQ(θ,GW)]. Second, G0 ∈ Γ, which we verify below. Together,
these contradict the welfare–optimality of GW.
Let us now verify that G0 ∈ Γ. The partition I∗ has the key property that ∆Q(θ) goes from
negative to positive on each in each I∗ ∈ I∗. Formally, for a suﬃciently small ￿, ∆Q(inf I∗+￿) <
0 for all I∗ ∈ I∗, except possibly for the lowest interval. Similarly, ∆Q(supI∗ − ￿) ≥ 0 for all
I∗ ∈ I∗, except possibly for the highest interval. To show Q(θ,G0) is increasing, pick θH > θL
and denote the respective partitions IH,IL ∈ I∗. If IH = IL, then Q(θH,G0) ≥ Q(θL,G0) follows
from the monotonicity of Q(θ,G) and Q(θ,GW). If IH 6= IL, then
Q(θH,G0) ≥ Q(inf IH − ￿,G0) ≥ Q(inf IH − ￿,GW)
≥ Q(supIL + ￿,GW) ≥ Q(supIL + ￿,G0) ≥ Q(θL,G0)
The ﬁrst, third and ﬁfth inequalities come from monotonicity. The second and forth inequalities
then follow from the above properties of I∗. Hence G0 ∈ Γ, as required.
For the second step, index the objective function h(θ,t) so that h(θ,1) = MR(θ) ≥ 0 and
h(θ,0) = θ. Under (MON), the function h(θ,t) ≥ 0 is log–supermodular. Since ∆Q(θ) is quasi–
increasing on each I∗ ∈ I∗, Karlin and Rubin (1956, Lemma 1) states that E[h(θ,t)∆Q(θ)|I∗]
is quasi–increasing in t.14 Thus E[θ∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≥ 0 implies that E[MR(θ)∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≥ 0. Inte-
grating over θ, we have E[MR(θ)∆Q(θ)] ≥ 0. That is, Π(GW) ≥ Π(G).
Corollary 1. If GW ⊂ GΠ then E[φ ◦ Q(θ,GW)] ≥ E[φ ◦ Q(θ,GΠ)] for all increasing, concave
functions φ : IR → IR.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 says that groups will tend to be ﬁner under proﬁt–maximisation than welfare–
maximisation. As shown by Corollary 1, this means that proﬁt–maximisation induces a dis-
tribution of quality levels that has lower a mean and will tend to be more dispersed. In the
school example, if one interprets Q(θ,G) as the exam scores of agent θ, then Corollary 1 yields
testable implications of the theory.
The idea behind the segregation eﬀect is that, under (MON), MR(θ) is steeper than θ, so
a proﬁt–maximising ﬁrm puts relatively more weight on the preferences of high types than the
13Notation: the function E[θ∆Q(θ)|I
∗] : [θ,θ] → IR maps each type into its conditional expectation.
14Karlin and Rubin (1956, Lemma 1) actually shows that the objective function is weakly quasi–increasing.







Figure 2: Sets in Proof of Proposition 1
social planner. This means a proﬁt–maximising ﬁrm is more likely to split up a group, which
helps the high types and hurts the low types. Intuitively, by introducing extra segregation the
principal raises the cost of pretending to be a lower type and reduces consumer surplus. That
is, by separating good and bad agents, the good agents become very keen to avoid the bad
groups and can be forced to pay higher prices.
As stated in the Introduction, Proposition 1 makes no assumption about the nature of the
peer eﬀects. This is important because peer technology diﬀers greatly across environments.
Instead, Proposition 1 only uses the monotonicity condition that comes endogenously from the
agents’ self selection constraints.
Proposition 1 does have one limitation in that the welfare– and proﬁt–maximising groups
may not be ordered in terms of set inclusion. One should therefore view the result as saying
that, if we start from the welfare–maximising group structure, then separating groups may
increase proﬁt, but merging groups will not. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the spirit of the
result may remain true even if the optimal solutions are not ordered.15,16
Example 1 (Pareto Distribution). Suppose θ ∼ Par(α,β), so that f(θ) = αβαθ−(α+1). In this
case, (MON) holds with equality and proﬁt is (1−α−1)E[θQ(θ,G)]. Consequently, the welfare–
and proﬁt–maximising group choices coincide. 4
15Figure 3 shows the proﬁt and welfare–maximising group structures where Q(G) = 0.55sup(G) + 0.45inf(G)
and θ ∼ U[2,3]. In this example, P is a grid with increments of 1/1000. See Examples 5 and 11 for more details.
16Proposition 1 shows that a proﬁt–maximising principal introduces more segregation than the welfare–
maximising principal. Similarly, one can show that a consumer–surplus–maximising principal introduces less




Figure 3: Optimal Group Formation: Linear Quality
5.3 Group Structure and Returns to Scale
This section analyses how diﬀerent types of peer technology aﬀect the optimal group structure.
Deﬁnition 1. Consider any GH,GL ∈ Γ such that GL ⊂ GH.
(a) Q(θ,G) has decreasing returns to scale (DRS) if E[Q(θ,GH)] ≥ E[Q(θ,GL)].
(b) Q(θ,G) has increasing returns to scale (IRS) if E[Q(θ,GH)] ≤ E[Q(θ,GL)].
Under DRS, splitting a group raises the average quality. Under IRS, splitting a group
lowers the average quality. Which case is appropriate depends upon the application and the
interpretation of a group. To illustrate, consider the school example. If one interprets a group
as a class, then dividing one class into two is likely to improve all students’ performance. This
suggests that the quality function will satisfy DRS. On the other hand, if one ﬁxes the class size
and interprets a group as an entire school, then the good students may help the poor students
more than the poor students harm the good students (Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau
(1978)). In this case, the quality function will satisfy IRS.
Proposition 2. Assume h(θ) is positive and increasing, and Q(G) is weakly increasing in G.
(a) Under decreasing returns to scale, the optimum is attained under full separation (i.e. G=P).
(b) Under increasing returns to scale, the optimum is attained when groups are connected.
Proof. (a) We prove a more general result: Suppose h(θ) is positive and increasing, and that
DRS holds. Then, for any GL,GH ∈ Γ such that GL ⊂ GH, the principal prefers GH to GL. If
Q(G) is weakly increasing then P ∈ Γ, so the optimum is attained when G = P.
Pick GL,GH ∈ Γ such that GL ⊂ GH, and denote ∆Q(θ) := Q(θ,GH) − Q(θ,GL). Let I∗ be
the coarsest partition on which ∆Q(θ) is quasi–increasing. By Lemma 3, I∗ ⊂ I(GL) ⊂ I(GH).
We claim that DRS implies
E[∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≥ 0 (5.5)
16To see this pick I∗ ∈ I∗ and let G0 equal GH on I∗ and equal GL elsewhere. First, G0 ∈ Γ, as in
the proof of Proposition 1. Second, since GL ⊂ G0, DRS implies
E[∆Q(θ)|I∗] = E[Q(θ,G0)] − E[Q(θ,GL)] ≥ 0
as required. This result implies that,
E[h(θ)∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≥ E[h(θ)|I∗]E[∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≥ 0
where the ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that an increasing function and a quasi–increasing
function have positive covariance (e.g. Persico (2000, Lemma 1)), and the second from (5.5).
Integrating over θ, GH yields a higher payoﬀ that GL.
(b) Suppose there is IRS. Consider an arbitrary group structure, G ∈ Γ. Form I(G) by
merging overlapping groups in G. Since Q(G) is weakly increasing, we have I(G) ∈ Γ. Moreover,
IRS implies that merging increases group quality so that E[h(θ)Q(θ,I(G))] ≥ E[h(θ)Q(θ,G)].
Proposition 2 says that when h(θ) is increasing, there is full separation under DRS and may
be pooling under IRS. This result applies to a welfare–maximising principal and, when MR(θ)
is increasing, to a proﬁt–maximising principal.17
Example 2 (Exponential Distribution). Suppose f(θ) = (1/λ)exp(−(θ−θ)/λ), where θ ≥ λ.
Then proﬁt is E[θQ(θ,G)]−λE[Q(θ,G)], and only diﬀers from welfare in the second expression.
Under DRS, full separation is optimal under both welfare– and proﬁt–maximisation. Under
IRS the second term decreases as G becomes ﬁner. Consequently, proﬁt is increased by splitting
a group only if welfare is increased by splitting a group, illustrating the segregation eﬀect. 4
5.4 Group Quality Functions
This section considers a number of examples which have occurred in the literature. Examples
3–6 satisfy increasing or decreasing returns to scale; Example 7 shows that the optimal group
structure may be more complex.
Example 3 (Average Quality). The average quality function, Q(G) = E[θ|θ ∈ G], satisﬁes
both increasing and decreasing returns to scale. As shown by Rayo (2005), one can then
handle objective functions that are non–monotone. In particular, when the ironed E[h(θ)|P]
is increasing, the principal chooses full separation; when the ironed E[h(θ)|P] is constant,
17Similarly, if h(θ) is constant, then there is full separation under DRS and full pooling under IRS. And if h(θ)
is decreasing, then there may be multiple groups under DRS and there is full pooling under IRS. This last result
can be shown by ironing the objective as in Myerson (1981).
17the principal chooses full pooling. Thus there will always be full separation under welfare–
maximisation, but there may be regions of pooling under proﬁt–maximisation, if MR(θ) is badly
behaved. This suggests welfare–maximisation leads to smaller groups than proﬁt–maximisation.
In comparison, Proposition 1 says that when we allow for diﬀerent quality functions, the reverse
is likely to be true. 4
Example 4 (Generalised Average Quality). Suppose Q(G) = φ1(E[φ2(θ)|θ ∈ G]). If φ1(·)
is concave and increasing, as suggested by the empirical analysis of Henderson, Mieszkowski,
and Sauvageau (1978), then the quality function has increasing returns to scale, by Jensen’s
inequality. The proﬁt–maximising group structure is then likely to exhibit some pooling and,
by Proposition 1, be ﬁner than the welfare–maximising group structure. 4
Example 5 (Linear Quality). Suppose Q(G) = αinf(G) + β sup(G) and θ ∼ U[θ,θ]. One
can verify that if G ∈ Γ, then Q(θ,G) = Q(θ,I(G)). Proposition 2(a) implies that if β ≤ α
(e.g. min–quality) there is decreasing returns to scale and welfare– and proﬁt–maximisation
will entail full separation. Conversely, if β ≥ α (e.g. max–quality) there is increasing returns
to scale and welfare– and proﬁt–maximisation will generally induce some pooling. 4
Example 6 (Multiplicative Quality). With multiplicative technology, Q(G) exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. Hence full separation is optimal if P ∈ Γ.18 Even with costly group formation,
it will be optimal to have assortative matching when P is suﬃciently ﬁne. To see this, suppose
G1 and G2 overlap. Then deﬁne disjoint G0
1 and G0
2 such that G0




2) = Q(G2). 4
Example 7 (Intervals Not Optimal). Suppose Q(G) = sup(G) − E[1G], so the quality of the
group depends upon its leader and the number of followers. This is one interpretation of the
results Mas and Moretti (2006) and Falk and Ichino (2006). Here, groups will not take the form
of intervals: it will be optimal to have lots of small groups, each with a very good leader. Since
groups will overlap, Lemma 2(a) implies that they must all have the same quality. 4
6 The Exclusion Eﬀect
In Section 5 we examined the optimal way to segregate diﬀerent types of agents when the
principal serves all agents. In this section we extend the analysis to allow for exclusion. In
the education example, these excluded agents may attend a public school or, in the case of
universities, enter the workplace.
18P ∈ Γ if, for example, σ(P) equals the Borel sets or P consists of intervals of equal measure.
18An agent has an outside option of zero. Given a group structure G, suppose A ∈ σ(G) are
excluded. Agents’ rents can then be characterised by Lemma 1, where the quality function is
given by Q(θ,G)1¬A.19
Lemma 4. In any incentive compatible mechanism hG,A,yi then
(a) A is decreasing; and
(b) A ∈ σ(I(G)).
Proof. Follows from the monotonicity condition (Lemma 1(c)).
6.1 Principal’s Problem
There are two possible reasons to exclude an agent. First, the principal might wish to exclude θ
if h(θ) < 0. Second, the principal can exclude groups to ‘monotonise’ a non–monotonic quality
function.
Formally, the principal’s problem is to choose a group structure G and a set of excluded
agents A to maximise
H = E [h(θ)Q(θ,G)1¬A]
subject to Q(θ,G)1¬A increasing in θ. Let D∗
G be the smallest decreasing set in σ(I(G)) such
that Q(θ,G) is increasing on [θ,θ]\D∗
G, and let Q∗(θ,G) := Q(θ,G)1¬D∗
G be the induced quality
function. Denote the positive and negative components of a function by φ(x)+ := max{φ(x),0}
and φ(x)− := −min{φ(x),0}.







Proof. Fix G. By Lemma 4, the excluded set A must be decreasing and measurable with respect
to σ(I(G)). Given such a set, the monotonicity condition is satisﬁed if and only if A ⊃ D∗
G.














The ﬁrst equality uses the law of iterated expectations, while the second uses the fact that
Q(θ,G) and A are measurable with respect to σ(I(G)). The principal thus chooses A ⊃ D∗
G to
maximise (6.2). Pointwise maximisation implies
A∗ = D∗
G ∪ {θ : E[h(θ)|I(G)] < 0} (6.3)
19Notation: ¬A := {θ : θ 6∈ A}.
19Since h(θ) is quasi–increasing, (6.3) is a decreasing set, as required. This yields equation
(6.1).
Observe that Lemma 5 applies to the welfare–maximisation problem and, under (MON), to
the proﬁt–maximisation problem. Moreover, if we assume that the quality function is weakly
increasing, then the principal need not exclude in order to ‘monotonise’ the quality function.
Lemma 6. Suppose that h(θ) is quasi–increasing and Q(G) is weakly increasing in G. Then






Proof. Suppose G 6∈ Γ maximises the principal’s payoﬀ (6.1). Then form a new structure G0 by
pooling all excluded agents into one group. Since Q(G) is weakly increasing, G0 ∈ Γ. The new
optimal set of excluded agents is then given by
A∗ = {θ : E[h(θ)|I(G0)] < 0}
The new group structure G0 therefore attains a (weakly) greater payoﬀ than G, as required.
6.2 Welfare– and Proﬁt–Maximisation
The principal’s problem is thus to choose G to maximise (6.1). Proposition 3 shows that the
segregation eﬀect extends to the case where the principal can exclude agents. Notably, this
result places no restrictions on the sign of MR(θ).
Proposition 3 (Segregation Eﬀect II). Suppose (MON) holds. For any welfare–maximising
solution, GW, Π(GW) ≥ Π(G) on {G : G ⊂ GW}. Hence if any optimal solutions, GW and GΠ,
are ordered in terms of set inclusion, then there exists a proﬁt–maximising solution, GΠ∗, such
that GW ⊂ GΠ∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
There are two eﬀects underlying Proposition 3. First, a proﬁt–maximising principal cares
relatively more about high value agents than a welfare–maximising principal (see Proposition
1). Second, a proﬁt–maximising principal is more willing to exclude agents than a welfare–
maximising agent (see Proposition 4). Hence the smaller group size provides additional ﬂexi-
bility to exclude some agents.
Proposition 4 (Exclusion Eﬀect). Suppose that (MON) holds and either (a) Q(G) is weakly
increasing in G, or (b) GW ⊂ GΠ. Then exclusion is higher under proﬁt–maximisation than
welfare–maximisation.
20Proof. Denote the types excluded under proﬁt–maximisation by AΠ and those excluded under
welfare–maximisation by AW.
(a) Lemma 6 implies AW = ∅, so that AW ⊂ AΠ.
(b) Suppose GW ⊂ GΠ. By Lemma 3, I(GW) ⊂ I(GΠ). Let I∗ be the coarsest partition
such that ∆Q(θ) := Q(θ,GΠ)− Q(θ,GW) is quasi–increasing. As in the proof of Proposition 1,
we have E[θ∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≤ 0. Yet if AΠ ( AW, then E[θ∆Q(θ)|I∗] > 0 on the ﬁrst interval in
I∗, yielding a contradiction.
The exclusion eﬀect is analogous to the standard monopoly distortion. Under proﬁt–
maximisation the principal would like to exclude agents with negative marginal revenue, whereas
under welfare–maximisation the principal would like to exclude no agents (see Proposition 4(a)).
The principal may also exclude agents in order to ‘monotonise’ the quality function. However,
the proﬁt–maximising principal is more likely to exclude agents than a welfare–maximising
principal since she cares less about low value agents (see Proposition 4(b)).
Proposition 5 provides a characterisation of the excluded agents. A quality function Q(G)
is increasing in G if Q(GH) ≥ Q(GL) whenever GH is larger than GL in strict set order.20
Proposition 5. Suppose h(θ) is increasing. Assume that either:
(a) Q(G) is weakly increasing in G and exhibits DRS; or
(b) Q(G) is increasing in G and exhibits IRS.
Then the principal’s objective is maximised by excluding the set A∗ = {θ : E[h(θ)|P] < 0}.
Proof. (a) Suppose Q(G) exhibits DRS. Since Q(G) is weakly increasing in G, Lemma 6 implies
that proﬁt is maximised by G ∈ Γ. Also observe that, given h(θ) is increasing, D := {θ :
E[h(θ)|P] < 0} is a decreasing set.
First, suppose that A ) D. Then form a new group structure G0 by including A\D as a
single group. Since Q(G) is weakly increasing, G0 ∈ Γ. Moreover, G0 yields a (weakly) higher
payoﬀ than G.
Next, suppose that A ( D. Since h(θ) is increasing, and Q(G) is weakly increasing and
exhibits DRS, Proposition 2(a) implies that the principal’s payoﬀs are maximised by full sepa-
ration.21 Lemma 6 then implies that the principal should exclude agents with E[h(θ)|P] < 0.
(b) Suppose Q(G) exhibits IRS. The proof that the principal’s payoﬀ is maximised by
A ⊂ D is the same as part (a). Next, suppose that A ( D. Since Q(G) is (weakly) increasing
and exhibits IRS, Proposition 2(b) implies that the principal’s payoﬀs are maximised when
groups are intervals.22 Denote the lowest included interval by I0. By Lemma 6, we must have
20Deﬁnition: GH is larger than GL in strict set order if min{θ,θ
0} ∈ GL and max{θ,θ
0} ∈ GH for all θ ∈ GL
and θ
0 ∈ GH.
21Proposition 2(a) does not allow for exclusion, but the result immediately extends. Intuitively, with exclusion,
smaller groups provide more ﬂexibility and, via Jensen’s inequality, further increase the principal’s payoﬀ.
22Proposition 2(b) does not allow for exclusion, but the proof is identical.
21E[h(θ)|I0] ≥ 0, so I0 is the only interval that intersects with D. Next, form a new group
structure, G00, by excluding D. Since Q(G) is (weakly) increasing, G00 ∈ Γ. Since Q(G) is




















so that G00 attains a (weakly) higher payoﬀ than G.
At ﬁrst sight, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the principal should exclude an agent
if and only if h(θ) < 0. There are two reasons why this may not be correct. First, the principal
may exclude more agents in order to ‘monotonise’ the quality function. Second, the principal
may exclude fewer agents if they exert a positive externality on the included agents, with
h(θ) > 0. Broadly speaking, Proposition 5 shows that both of these possibilities are ruled out
if the quality function is increasing.
7 Costly Group Formation
The segregation eﬀect (Proposition 1) states that groups will be ﬁner under proﬁt–maximisation
than welfare–maximisation. With costly group formation this is countered by the appropriabil-
ity eﬀect: a proﬁt–maximising principal cannot capture consumer surplus and may not invest
enough in creating groups. Examples 8–9 illustrate how the appropriability eﬀect can dominate
the segregation eﬀect. Proposition 6 then derives suﬃcient conditions for the segregation eﬀect
to dominate the appropriability eﬀect.
In order to focus on the segregation eﬀect, we suppose the principal cannot exclude any
agents.23 The principal’s problem is thus to choose G ∈ Γ to maximise H(G) − c(G), where
H(G) := E[h(θ)Q(θ,G)] and c(G) is an arbitrary cost function.
Example 8 (Appropriability Eﬀect I). Suppose θ ∼ Par(α,β), as in Example 1. Then the








θdF − c(G) (7.1)
This coincides with the welfare–maximising problem if α = ∞. Suppose that c(G) only depends
on G through the number of groups N, and is increasing in N (e.g. N is the number of teachers).
23One can allow for exclusion using the ‘evil type’ approach in footnote 10. Proposition 6 then holds no matter
what the sign of MR(θ). Saying this, the result is less interesting when MR(θ) < 0 since G
W and G
Π are unlikely
to be ordered, as assumed in the ﬁnal line.
22It then follows from (7.1) that there will be more groups under welfare–maximisation than
proﬁt–maximisation.24 4
Example 9 (Appropriability Eﬀect II). Suppose that splitting a group increases everyone’s
quality (e.g. multiplicative quality) and that MR(θ) ≥ 0. Hence ∆Q(θ) = Q(θ,GH)−Q(θ,GL) ≥
0 (∀θ), for GL,GH ∈ Γ such that GL ⊂ GH. Since θ ≥ MR(θ) ≥ 0, we have E[θ∆Q(θ)] ≥
E[MR(θ)∆Q(θ)]. That is, whenever a proﬁt–maximiser splits a group, a welfare–maximiser
will also split the group. 4
Assumption (HR). [1 − F(θ)]/f(θ) is decreasing in θ.
Proposition 6 (Weak Segregation Eﬀect). Suppose (HR) holds and Q(G) exhibits increasing
returns to scale. For any welfare–maximising solution, GW, Π(GW) ≥ Π(G) on {G ∈ Γ : G ⊂
GW}. Hence if any optimal solutions, GW and GΠ, are ordered in terms of set inclusion, then
there exists a proﬁt–maximising solution, GΠ∗, such that GW ⊂ GΠ∗.
Proof. Suppose GW maximises welfare and ﬁx G ⊂ GW, such that G ∈ Γ. Hence E[θ∆Q(θ)] ≥
c(GW) − c(G), where ∆Q(θ) = Q(θ,GW) − Q(θ,G). By Lemma 3, I(G) ⊂ I(GW).
Let I∗ be the coarsest partition on which ∆Q(θ) is quasi–increasing. As in Proposition
2, IRS implies that E[∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≤ 0. Since ∆Q(θ) is quasi–increasing on each I∗ ∈ I∗,
E[1D∆Q(θ)] ≤ 0 for any decreasing set D.
For decreasing sets {Di} and positive constants {ai}, i ∈ {1,...,m}, E[
P
i ai1Di∆Q(θ)] ≤ 0.
Since (HR) implies that [1−F(θ)]/f(θ) is decreasing, we can deﬁne {Di} such that
P
i ai1Di →








Equation (7.2) implies that
Π(GW) − Π(G) = E[MR(θ)∆Q(θ)] ≥ E[θ∆Q(θ)] ≥ c(GW) − c(G)
as required.
The appropriability eﬀect states that a proﬁt–maximising principal cannot capture consumer
surplus and may not invest enough in group formation. Under (HR) and IRS, consumer surplus
is maximised by complete pooling, so a proﬁt–maximiser will be willing to invest more in group
formation than a welfare–maximiser.
24There are other variants of this result. For example, if c(GH) ≥ c(GL) for GL ⊂ GH, then W(G
Π) ≥ W(G)
on {G ∈ Γ : G ⊂ G
Π}.
23Proposition 6 is more restrictive than the original segregation eﬀect (Proposition 1). First,
it assumes that the distribution of types satisﬁes (HR) rather than (MON). Deﬁning h(θ,0) = θ
and h(θ,1) = MR(θ), (MON) implies that h(θ,t) is log–supermodular, while the stronger (HR)
assumption is required for h(θ,t) to be supermodular. Second, the result assumes that Q(G)
satisﬁes IRS, overcoming the problem in Example 9.
Example 10 provides a tractable numerical illustration of Proposition 6. Observe that
Example 10 exhibits constant returns to scale, so the conditions of Proposition 6 are stronger
than necessary.
Example 10 (Average Quality). Suppose Q(G) = E[θ | G] and c(G) only depends on G
through the number of groups, N. By Proposition 2(b), the optimal group structure consists
of intervals. The principal then chooses cutoﬀs {θi}N
i=0 to maximise welfare or proﬁt (5.4).
Assume σ(P) equals the Borel sets, enabling the use of calculus. When θ ∼ U[θ,θ], the FOCs
for {θi}N−1
i=1 reduce to (θi+1 −θi) = (θi −θi−1) under both welfare– and proﬁt–maximisation. If
θ is suﬃciently high, such that exclusion is not desirable under either objective, then marginal
welfare from an extra group is dW/dN = (θ−θ)2/6N3, while the marginal proﬁt from an extra
group is dΠ/dN = (θ − θ)2/3N3. Since dΠ/dN ≥ dW/dN, a proﬁt–maximising principal will
choose to have more groups.25
This example shows that, once again, proﬁt–maximisation exhibits excessive segregation.
However, conditional on choosing the same number of groups, the welfare– and proﬁt–maximising
principals will choose to divide agents in the same manner. This makes regulation relatively
easy: the government need only restrict the total number of tariﬀs; the principal will then
choose the welfare–maximising group structure.26 4
8 Group Size and Relative Position
In this section we investigate how the size of groups changes with the types of agents. These
results are of particular interest in the education market, where they enable us to assess how
class composition should change (a) with ability and (b) over time.
Our results can be summarised as follows. In Section 8.1, we show that, under costless
group formation, higher types will tend to be in larger groups. In Section 8.2, we show this
result extends to costly group formation if the quality function exhibits increasing returns to
scale, but reverses under decreasing returns. Finally we relate our results to those of Lazear
(2001) and discuss the implications for education.
25See Web Appendix. http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/board/papers/groups-webappendix.pdf.
26Although the models are very diﬀerent, this result resembles Epple and Romano (1998, Propsition 4(i))
which showed that, conditional on the number of schools, a private system segregates students optimally. Their
paper also showed that the business stealing eﬀect tends to lead to excessive entry of private schools.
248.1 Costless Group Formation
In order to examine how group size changes with agents’ types, we consider the following
experiment. First, suppose that types are initially distributed according to θ ∼ f(θ) on [θ,θ].
We then examine the eﬀect of an upwards shift in the distribution so that θ ∼ f(θ − t) on
[θ + t,θ + t]. We then compare the size of the group containing θ in the initial distribution
to that containing θ + t in the shifted distribution. For an arbitrary group, G, under the
initial distribution, let G(t) := G + t. Similarly deﬁne G(t),Γ(t) and P(t) relative to the new
distribution.
Assumption (LIN). A vertical shift aﬀects group quality linearly: Q(G(t)) = Q(G(0)) +λt.
The (LIN) assumption is satisﬁed by average–quality (λ = 1) and linear–quality (λ = α+β)




h(θ,t)Q(θ,G(t))f(θ − t) dθ.
Under (LIN) we can change variables to ˜ θ = θ − t. Under welfare–maximisation, h(θ,t) = θ,
so the objective becomes h(˜ θ + t,t) = ˜ θ + t. Under proﬁt–maximisation, h(θ,t) = θ − [1 −
F(θ − t)]/f(θ − t) so the objective becomes h(˜ θ + t,t) = MR(˜ θ) + t. Putting this together,





[h(˜ θ) + t][Q(˜ θ,G) + λt]f(˜ θ) d˜ θ. (8.1)
Proposition 7. Suppose h(θ)+t is positive and increasing in θ, and that quality satisﬁes (LIN).
Fix tH > tL. For any tH–optimal solution, GH, H(GH,tL) ≥ H(G,tL) on {G ∈ Γ : G ⊂ GH}.
Hence if any optimal solutions, GL and GH, are ordered in terms of set inclusion, then there
exists a tL–optimal solution, GL∗, such that GH ⊂ GL∗.
Proof. The function h(θ)+t is positive and increasing in θ, and is therefore log–submodular in
(θ,t). The rest of the proof is identical to Proposition 1.
Proposition 7 says that higher types will tend to be in larger groups under welfare or proﬁt–
maximisation. To understand the result, take a group [θL + t,θH + t] and consider a split that
reduces the quality of the low types a lot, while raising the quality of the high types a little.
When the agents’ types are low (i.e. t is low), the ratio between the highest and lowest types
in the group, (θH + t)/(θL + t), is large and this split may increase welfare/proﬁt. Yet when
the agents’ types are high (i.e. t is high), the ratio between the highest and lowest types in the
group is small and the split is less likely to be beneﬁcial.
27This assumes the principal cannot exclude. As in footnote 10, this is without loss if h(θ,t) is always positive.
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Our result concerns the group structure as the entire distribution of types shifts. It also
suggests that higher types will be in larger groups than lower types within a given distribution
if the relative ratio of high types to low types remains constant throughout the distribution
(e.g. the density is uniform, ignoring boundary problems). This can be seen in Figure 3, where
higher types are in larger groups under both welfare– and proﬁt–maximisation.
Proposition 7 assumes that the quality function satisﬁes (LIN). Without this assumption
the result may be overturned, and high types may be in smaller groups than low types. For
example, Figure 4 illustrates the welfare–maximising partition under Cobb–Douglas quality.28
In this case, agents below a certain cutoﬀ are pooled into one giant group, while all other types
are very ﬁnely segregated. Intuitively, for low types the quality function is very concave and
the returns to scale are large; for high types the quality function is less concave and the returns
to scale are small.
8.2 Costly Group Formation
With costly group formation, the principal’s problem is to choose G ∈ Γ to maximise H(G,t)−
c(G), where H(G,t) is deﬁned by (8.1) and c(G) is an arbitrary cost function.
Proposition 8. Suppose h(θ) + t is increasing in θ, and that quality satisﬁes (LIN). Suppose
either:
(a) there are increasing returns to scale and ﬁx t00 < t0; or
(b) there are decreasing returns to scale and ﬁx t00 > t0.
Then for any t0–optimal solution, G0, H(G0,t00) ≥ H(G,t00) on {G ∈ Γ : G ⊂ G0}. Hence if any
optimal solutions, G0 and G00, are ordered in terms of set inclusion, there exists a t00–optimal
solution, G00∗, such that G0 ⊂ G00∗.
Proof. Suppose IRS holds and ﬁx t0 > t00. Consider a t0–optimal solution, G0, and consider
G ⊂ G0. IRS implies that E[∆Q(θ)] ≤ 0, where ∆Q(θ) := Q(θ,G0) − Q(θ,G). Observe that
H(G0,t) − H(G,t) = E[(h(θ) + t)∆Q(θ)] and
E[(h(θ) + t00)∆Q(θ)] − E[(h(θ) + t0)∆Q(θ)] = (t00 − t0)E[∆Q(θ)] ≥ 0
28In Figure 4, θ ∼ U[0.5,1], Q(G) = (E[θ|G] − 0.5)
0.3 and σ(P) equals the Borel sets. In the ﬁnely segregated
part, the groups are around 0.0001 wide.
26Hence H(G0,t0)−H(G,t0) ≥ c(G0)−c(G) implies H(G0,t00)−H(G,t00) ≥ c(G0)−c(G), as required.
The proof for DRS is identical.
Proposition 8 says that (a) under IRS, higher types are in larger groups; and (b) under
DRS, higher types are in smaller groups. In comparison, if there is costless group formation
then (a) under IRS, higher types are in larger groups (Proposition 7); and (b) under DRS,
there is full separation (Proposition 2). To understand this result, consider the IRS case.
Splitting a group has an eﬃciency eﬀect, reducing the mean group quality, and a distributional
eﬀect, beneﬁting high types while hurting low types. When all types are higher, then the ratio
between the highest and lowest types in a group declines, and the distributional eﬀect becomes
less important. Hence the eﬃciency eﬀect becomes paramount, leading to an increase in group
size.
Proposition 8 considers a shift of the entire distribution of types. Example 11 shows that,
under the uniform–linear model, a similar result applies within a given distribution of types.
Example 11 (Linear–Quality). Suppose Q(G) = αinf(G) + β sup(G) and c(G) only depends
on G through the number of groups, N. By Example 5, the optimal group structure consists
of intervals. The welfare–maximising principal then chooses cutoﬀs {θi}N
i=0 to maximise (5.1).
Assume θ ∼ U[θ,θ] and let σ(P) equal the Borel sets, enabling the use of calculus. Under
constant returns to scale (α = β), the FOCs for {θi}N−1
i=1 reduce to (θi+1 − θi) = (θi − θi−1),
as in Example 10, so groups are the same size for all types. Under DRS (i.e. α ≥ β), then
(θi+1 − θi) ≤ (θi − θi−1), so groups are smaller for higher types. Under IRS (i.e. α ≤ β), then
(θi+1 − θi) ≥ (θi − θi−1), so groups are larger for higher types.29 4
These results have implications for education markets. When considering the optimal class-
room size, the assumption of decreasing returns seems reasonable. Proposition 8 then suggests
that more able students should be in smaller classes. Intuitively, when students are more able,
they have more to gain from a reduction in class size. This results seems consistent with the
35% reduction is U.S. pupil–teacher ratio over the last half–century (Hanushek (1999)).
This result can also be contrasted to Lazear (2001, Proposition 1) which shows that, with
multiplicative quality, groups are larger for higher types. The reason for Lazear’s result is that,
under multiplicative quality, there are signiﬁcant decreasing returns to scale when θ is low, but
approximately constant returns as θ approaches one. This is the reverse of the logic behind the
Cobb–Douglas example in Figure 4.
When considering the optimal school composition, holding class size constant, Henderson,
Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau (1978) suggest that increasing returns may be the appropriate
assumption. Propositions 7–8 then imply that selective grammar schools were of more use in
the 1950s, when education levels were relatively low, than today.
29See Web Appendix. http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/board/papers/groups-webappendix.pdf.
279 Conclusion
This paper has analysed how a principal will divide agents into groups in the presence of peer
eﬀects. With costless group formation, we showed that a proﬁt–maximising principal will seg-
regate agents more ﬁnely than is socially optimal (the segregation eﬀect) and exclude too many
agents (the exclusion eﬀect). We also analysed how the optimal group structure depends upon
the returns to scale of the peer technology. With costly group formation, we demonstrated that
a proﬁt–maximising ﬁrm may not invest enough in group formation (the appropriability eﬀect).
However, under increasing returns to scale, the segregation eﬀect dominates the appropriability
eﬀect.
Our analysis has direct implications for public policy. The large growth in private communi-
ties suggests that these developments are ﬁlling a gap in the market, leading to welfare gains for
parts of society. Our model is consistent with this fact: even when agents beneﬁt from living in
varied communities (i.e. under increasing returns to scale) then the welfare–maximising outcome
will exhibit assortative matching, consisting of diﬀerent tiers of communities. Nevertheless, the
segregation eﬀect illustrates that private community development will often lead to excessively
homogenous neighbourhoods. This suggests that, in cases where a few local developers have
market power, the government should be especially careful to ensure new developments contain
a wide range of housing stock.
This paper also informs the debate on the role of private schools. Much of the discussion over
vouchers and public–private partnerships centres on the mantra of parental choice. However,
choice is not the aim in itself. This paper has shown that when the options are designed
by an organisation with market power, then private provision may provide too much choice,
introducing excessive segregation. On the positive side, given knowledge of these distortions,
there is no reason why an alert regulatory agency cannot mitigate their impact.
28A Omitted Material
A.1 Multiplicative Technology
Kremer (1993) and Lazear (2001) consider a group of agents, G = {p1,...,pµ(G)}, where agent
i makes a mistake with probability pi = 1 − θi. For example, one can think of a project that






We now consider a continuous type analogue to this quality function. Suppose agents
types are distributed according to absolutely continuous measure µ, where µ([θ,θ]) = m. Let
f(θ) = dµ(θ)/m be the normalised density. The quality of a group G ⊂ [θ,θ] is determined
as follows. First, as in the discrete model, suppose that a project requires µ(G) jobs to be
completed. Second, break each job into k equal tasks. Third, draw k agents independently
from G, where each agent makes a mistake with probability pi/k. Then let each of these agents



































ln(1) − ln(1 − pi/k)
pi/k
For each k we draw a new set of agents with error probabilities {pi}k
i=1, so ∆k(pi) is a triangular





























→ −µ(G)E[p | G]
where the second line uses ln(1) = 0.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Pick IH ∈ I(GH). By construction, there exists a GH ∈ GH such that IH = IGH(GH). Since
GL ⊂ GH, there exists {GHj}j∈J such that GHj ∈ GH and GH ∈ ∪j∈JGHj = GL for some
GL ∈ GL. Clearly,
IH = IGH(GH) ⊂ ∪j∈JIGH(GHj)
Since IG(G) is the smallest interval containing G, IGH(GHj) ⊂ IGH(∪j∈JGHj) for each j ∈ J.
Thus,
∪j∈JIGH(GHj) ⊂ ∪j∈JIGH(∪j∈JGHj) = IGH(∪j∈JGHj) = IGH(GL)
Since GL ⊂ GH, the deﬁnition of IG(G) implies that
IGH(GL) ⊂ IGL(GL) ∈ I(GL)
We have thus shown that IH ∈ I(GL), as required.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose GW ⊂ GΠ. Lemma 3 implies that I(GW) ⊂ I(GΠ). Let I∗ be the coarsest partition
such that ∆Q(θ) := Q(θ,GΠ) − Q(θ,GW) is quasi–increasing.
Lemma 8. E[∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≤ 0.
Proof. As in Proposition 1, we have E[θ∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≤ 0. For any I∗ ∈ I∗, it follows that
0 ≥ E[θ∆Q(θ)|I∗] ≥ E[θ|I∗]E[∆Q(θ)|I∗]
30where the second inequality comes from the fact that a quasi–increasing function is positively
correlated with an increasing function (e.g. Persico (2000, Lemma 1)).
Fix I∗ ∈ I∗. Denote the distribution function of Q(θ,GΠ), conditional on θ ∈ I∗, by
FΠ(q) := E[1Q(θ,GΠ)≤q|I∗] Similarly deﬁne the distribution function of Q(θ,GW), conditional
on θ ∈ I∗, by FW(q) := E[1Q(θ,GW)≤q|I∗].
Lemma 9. For any I∗ ∈ I∗, FW(q) − FΠ(q) is weakly quasi–increasing.
Proof. Q(θ,GW) and Q(θ,GΠ) are increasing, so denote the inverses by Q−1
W (q) := inf{θ :
Q(θ,GW) > q} and Q−1
Π (q) := inf{θ : Q(θ,GΠ) > q}. Q(θ,GΠ) − Q(θ,GW) is quasi–increasing
on I∗, so Q−1
W (q) − Q−1
Π (q) is weakly quasi–increasing. The diﬀerence between the distribution
functions is
FW(q) − FΠ(q) = E[1θ≤Q−1
W (q) − 1θ≤Q−1
Π (q)|I∗]
Hence FW(q) − FΠ(q) is weakly quasi–increasing.
For I∗ ∈ I∗, Lemmas 8–9 imply that [Q(θ,GW)|I∗] ≥icv [Q(θ,GΠ)|I∗], where ≥icv denotes
the increasing–concave order (Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994, Theorem 3.A.12(b))). The
increasing–concave order is closed under mixtures so Q(θ,GW) ≥icv Q(θ,GΠ) (Shaked and
Shanthikumar (1994, Theorem 3.A.5(b))).
A.4 Monotone Comparative Statics used in Appendix A.5
The function h(θ,t) is extended–log–supermodular if for θH ≥ θL and tH ≥ tL,
h(θH,tH)h(θL,tL) ≥ h(θH,tL)h(θL,tH) (A.1)
If h(θ,t) is also positive, then it is log–supermodular.
Lemma 10. Suppose h(θ,t) is extended–log–supermodular, weakly quasi–increasing in θ and
weakly quasi–increasing in −t. Then for any partition I, E[h(θ,t)|I]+ is log–supermodular.
Proof. First, we show that the properties of h(θ,t) carry over to ψ(θ,t) := E[h(θ,t)|I]. Suppose








[h(θH,tH)h(θL,tL) − h(θL,tH)h(θH,tL)]dF(θH)dF(θL) ≥ 0
using the extended–log–supermodularity of h(θ,t). Similarly, if h(θ,t) is weakly quasi–increasing
in a parameter then ψ(θ,t) has the same property.
31Second, we show that ψ(θ,t)+ is log–supermodular. Pick θH > θL and tH > tL. If
ψ(θL,tH) ≤ 0, then ψ(θ,t)+ is trivially log–supermodular. If ψ(θL,tH) > 0, then ψ(θH,tH) ≥ 0
and ψ(θL,tL) ≥ 0 from the monotonicity properties of ψ(θ,t). The log–supermodularity of
ψ(θ,t)+ follows from the extended–log–supermodularity of ψ(θ,t).
Lemmas 11–12 are variants of Karlin and Rubin (1956, Lemma 1). The method of proof is
identical.
Lemma 11. Consider groups GL,GH such that I(GL) ⊂ I(GH) and assume Q(θ,G) ≥ 0.
Suppose that E[h(θ,t)|I(GH)]+ is log–supermodular in (θ,t) and decreasing in t. Consider the
















is quasi–increasing in t.
Proof. Write ψ(θ,t) := E[h(θ,t)|I(GH)] and ∆Q(θ) := Q(θ,GH) − Q(θ,GL). Rewriting (A.2)











































Since ∆Q(θ) is increasing on I, so we can break it up into positive and negative components.
That is, ∆Q(θ) ≥ 0 on some I+ ∈ IH and ∆Q(θ) < 0 on I− := I\I+. For notational




























There are two possible cases. First, suppose that the left hand side of (A.6) equals zero. Then
(A.6) implies the left hand side of (A.6) is also zero and, since ψ(θ,t) is decreasing in t, the left
hand side of (A.7) is zero. We thus obtain a contradiction. Second, we suppose the left hand


































We now show that (A.8) also yields a contradiction. This follows from two facts. First, using



























[ψ(θH,tH)+ψ(θL,tL)+ − ψ(θH,tL)+ψ(θL,tH)+]∆Q(θH)+∆Q(θL)−dF(θH)dF(θL) ≥ 0



















Together, (A.9) and (A.10) contradict (A.8), as required.
Lemma 12. Suppose ∆Q(θ) is quasi–increasing on I. In addition, suppose that h(θ,t) is
log–supermodular in (θ,t) and decreasing in t. Then E[h(θ,t)∆Q(θ)|I] is quasi–increasing in t.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 11.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The method of proof is the same as in Proposition 1. Suppose GW maximises welfare and pick
G such that G ⊂ GW. We wish to show that Π(GW) ≥ Π(G). By Lemma 3, I(G) ⊂ I(GW).



























Let ∆Q∗(θ) := Q∗(θ,GW)−Q∗(θ,G). Since GW maximises welfare, E[∆W(θ)] ≥ 0. Observe
that ∆Q∗(θ) is increasing on each I ∈ I(G) and let I∗ be the coarsest partition such that ∆Q∗(θ)
is quasi–increasing for all I∗ ∈ I∗.
Lemma 13. E[∆W(θ)|I∗] ≥ 0.
Proof. Same as Proposition 1.
33Lemma 14. E[∆Π(θ)|I∗] ≥ 0 and hence E[∆Π(θ)] ≥ 0.
Proof. Let us divide the state space into two. MR(θ) is quasi–increasing in θ, so E[MR(θ)|I(G)]
is positive on some increasing set IB ⊂ [θ,θ], and strictly negative on the compliment, IA.
First, E[∆W(θ)|I∗] ≥ 0 implies E[∆W(θ)1IB|I∗] ≥ 0. To see this, notice that the function
h(θ,t) = θ1θ≥t is log–supermodular and decreasing in t. Let h(θ,0) = θ and h(θ,1) = θ1IB and
apply Lemma 12.
Second, let h(θ,0) = θ1IB and h(θ,1) = MR(θ)1IB. Under (MON), h(θ,t) is extended–
log–supermodular in (θ,t), weakly quasi–increasing in θ and decreasing in t. Lemma 10 im-
plies that E[h(θ,t)|I(GW)]+ is log–supermodular and decreasing in t. Hence, by Lemma 11,
E[∆W(θ)1IB|I∗] ≥ 0 implies that E[∆Π(θ)1IB|I∗] ≥ 0.
Third, E[MR(θ)1IA|I(G)]+ = 0, so E[∆Π(θ)1IA|I∗] ≥ 0. Thus E[∆Π(θ)1IB|I∗] ≥ 0 implies
E[∆Π(θ)|I∗] ≥ 0.
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